Abstract: Legal and illegal global trade of exotic bird and wildlife facilitates dynamic disease transmission mechanisms that threaten livelihoods, international trade, livestock production and native wildlife populations. Disease outbreaks resulting from exotic bird and wildlife trade have caused substantial economic damage globally. Contacts between wildlife, poultry and humans facilitate inter-species disease transferences.
Introduction
Cheap, fast and extensive transportation alternatives, ease of mobility across borders, human and livestock population increments, emergence of worldwide agrofood networks and changes in modern livestock production systems are coincident with an increased risk of zoonotic disease transmissions. The emergence of zoonotic diseases such as Nipah in 1999, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002 and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) since late 2003 have heightened public awareness of linkages between wildlife, livestock production and human health. For example, the recent HPAI epidemics in Italy, the Netherlands and Canada have shown that in densely populated poultry production zones the control of HPAI poses a substantial challenge, even for industrialized, integrated production systems with high-quality animal health services and strict bio-security measures. Industrialization of livestock production is synchronously occurring in developing countries, where intensive production is rapidly replacing traditional systems, most notably in Asia, South America and North Africa. A major consequence of modern industrial intensive livestock production systems is that they potentially allow the rapid selection and amplification of pathogens and concomitantly its dissemination over poultry populations in s hort periods of time. Without disregarding these health issues, only a comprehensively multifactor, evidence-based approach to disease risk management on industrial poultry farming can sustain a safe and affordable food supply. Evidence suggests that non-domesticated waterfowl are the primary reservoir of Influenza A Viruses (IAV) and probably all influenza viruses of mammals have ancestral links to wild avian lineages (Webby and Webster, 2001) . Positive HPAI diagnosis of wild birds in Asia, Europe and Egypt further prove this evidently close relationship. This short review article compiles evidence suggesting a relationship between wildlife trade and the increased risk of zoonotic disease transmission.
Exotic Bird and Wildlife Trade
Wildlife is a major source of income: Directly for consumptive or productive uses and indirectly for touristic and scientific uses. For instance, wildlife tourism is among the top cash-generating activities of Tanzania and Kenya, adding to an annual income of approximately half a billion USD. In the US, the total expenditures for wildlife-related activities was $101 billion in 1996 (Chardonnet et al., 2002) . Trade of wild plants and animals around the globe is estimated to be in the order of roughly 350 millions units annually, without considering all potentially illegal transaction and movements that occur (WWF, 2001) . The extent o f wildlife trade is evidenced by data collected after the 2003 SARS outbreak in Guangzhou, China, where 838,500 wild animals were confiscated from live markets (BBC, 2003) . In a single market survey conducted in Bangkok, Thailand during 25 weekends, over 70,000 birds of 276 species were sold (Round, 1990) . Another survey on live wild animal trade was conducted along the Guangxi border between China and Vietnam during 1993-1996, resulting in 55 species unaccounted for in customs files, including 15 species of mammals, 10 species of birds, 29 species of reptiles and 1 species of amphibian; with many of them listed in China's species protection list (Yiming and Dianmo, 1998) . The increasingly global scope of exotic bird and wildlife trade, couple with inexpensive, rapid and modern transportation options, temporary communal storage facilities and the functional dimension of markets as (Radostits, 2001 ). This only applies to animals but not networking nodes rather than product endpoints poultry keepers and workers, as regardless o f dramatically increase the likelihood of cross-species production system used, human involvement will always transmission dynamics of the various infectious agents be present. Thus, livestock keepers and people in close that every animal naturally hosts. Smolinski et al. contact with live birds are the most likely group to serve (2003) demonstrates through a retrospective study that as bridge between IAV and communities at large, since 1980 over 35 new transmissible diseases assuming the virus acquires human-to-human emerged in humans; this amounts roughly to 1 every 8 transmission capabilities. Saenz et al. (2006) showed, months. This comes to no surprise for the newest using a mathematical model, that if 15% of animal zoonotic diseases: SARS corona virus is associated to farming workers comprise a living community, they can small carnivore and bat trade (Bell et al., 2004) (Peiris et al., 2001) where they co-circulate with regional another way for introducing novel infectious agents into H9N2 subtypes with the potential of reassortment with ecosystems (Karesh et al., 2005) . Furthermore, in 2007, avian H 5N1. For example, in 1999 IAV H9N2 was two released scaly-breasted munias ( Lonchuria isolated from two flu-recovering farm girls in Hong Kong punctulata) tested positive for HPAI H5N1 in Hong Kong (Peiris et al., 1999) , further providing evidence that (GovHK, 2007) and a caged songbird commonly known genetic changes can occur. Additionally, Myers et al. as black francolin also tested positive for HPAI i n (2006) reported that swine keepers had higher H1 and Pakistan (Karesh et al., 2007) . In a list of 1,415 human H2 t itre antibodies and greatly elevated risks o f pathogens, close to 61% are known to be zoonotic and seropositivity vis-à-vis community benchmarks; whereas multiple host pathogens are twice as likely to b e Bridges et al. (2002) states that the probability of carrying associated with an emerging transmissible disease of H5 antibodies increases as occupational contacts with humans (Taylor et al., 2001) , while 77% of pathogens birds increases. A 2003 Italian serology study found antifound in livestock are shared with at least another host H7 immunoglobulins in 38% of samples from poultry species (Haydon et al., 2002) . In Asian countries, early keepers when IAV-H7N3 was circulating (Puzelli et et al., 2004) ; also in South China with IAVH5 as well transmission dynamics between animals and humans, (Wong et al., 2006) . first, there needs to be a point of contact between them Highly pathogenic IAV, thus far, does not easily infect for the species barrier to be crossed; considering this humans and it is only the Asian IAV-H5N1 that appears point is critical in designing disease transmission to have a ~60% fatality rate in infected humans. mitigation strategies. Another practical approach t o Increased exposure to situations were avian species are decrease dissemination risk would include presently situated increases the likelihood of disease minimizing intra-species contact: for example, a 1 day transmission, which could facilitate the emergence of a per month closure of retail poultry markets in Hong Kong novel mutation-induced virus with human-to-human moderately reduced H9N2 avian influenza infection rates infection attributes, thus transforming itself from a in birds (Kung et al., 2003) .
controllable, purely animal disease into a human
The Animal-Human Interface: Disease Transmission Nutritional factors dealing with soil and plant mineral Dynamics deficiencies may be involved in Asian IAV human Bio-security is defined as any practice or system infective abilities, as it is cleverly suggested in a series that p revents the spread of infectious agents from of elegant experiments done by Beck et al. (2003) , in the infected to susceptible animals, or prevents the US, where influenza-inoculated rats fed selenium introduction of infected animals into a herd, region or deficient diets had increased virulence accompanied by country in which the infection has not yet occurred viral genome changes in a segment previously thought influenza pandemic of gargantuan proportions.
to be relatively stable. Similarly, Maines et al. (2006) , using a ferret model, concluded after several experimental designs that H5N1 viruses require further adaptive steps and factors to develop pandemic potential. Still, after much debate, frequent human interaction with sick birds remains the main issue. According to Capua and Alexander (2007) the growing frequency of IAV detection in animals and therefore humans, may be due to substantial increases in poultry populations worldwide, improved telecommunications, heightened poultry oversight, enhanced laboratory diagnostic capacities and incentive-based disease reporting.
Conclusions:
Mounting scientific evidence clearly suggest that wild birds are focal IAV reservoirs and that the relational contact with poultry, be it through backyard/garden farming or live bird markets, provides a propitious platform to transmit diseases. Traditional and non-traditional disease mitigation strategies, such as culling and vaccination, are almost impossible to apply to bird populations in the wild. Exotic bird and wildlife trade-as a source of income and food-has been implicated in increased disease transmission dynamics; however, it has been claimed that the transformation from lowly pathogenic IAV into highly pathogenic, deadly IAV strains is not due to fulminating wild bird carriers, but more so due to the highly intensive, genetically homogeneous, industrially dense conditions of contemporary animal factories. Bio-security, as it is now defined, is the outcome of all activities undertaken by an entity to preclude the introduction of disease agents into an area that one is trying to protect. These cost-effective disease mitigation activities will substantially affect the projected worldwide growth and rearing modes of industrial livestock production systems to meet global protein demands in coming years; with the overall objective of decreasing the impact of disease outbreaks on trade, society, economy, livestock and human health, ecosystems and national food security.
Recommendations
Sprawling cities and major hubs associated with wildlife and exotic bird trade provide feasible control points to maximize the impact of governmental regulatory efforts against zoonotic diseases. Evidence-based disease mitigation strategies could include, among many others, surveillance of most susceptible wild bird species, sanitary regulation compliance, strengthening and enforcement of traditional disease control measures, exotic wild bird trader registration, development and implementation of quarantine procedures and creating mechanisms to shift costs of controlling outbreaks from the public to the animal and wildlife suppliers/vendors.
